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ABSTRACT 
 
The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Choice  
of Transfer Pricing Methods in China 
by 
 
HAN Xue 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
Recent scandals involving related party transactions (RPTs) have attracted 
researchers’ and governments’ attention. Because imperfections exist in the 
legislation of RPTs, business groups might abuse transfer pricing of such transactions 
for certain purposes. These purposes include earnings management of listed 
companies that seek to attract investors and profit shifting from subsidiaries to parent 
companies. This study investigates the impact of corporate governance on the choice 
of transfer pricing methods in China.   
 
I classify transfer pricing methods into two major groups (i.e., market-based and 
cost-based methods). I hypothesize that companies with weak corporate governance 
are more likely to use cost-based pricing methods, which are regarded as subjective 
and more easily manipulated. According to previous studies on corporate governance, 
a smaller board size, CEO-Chairman duality (i.e. the CEO and the Chairman of the 
company are the same person), and a lower percentage of independent directors on 
the board are indicators of weak corporate governance. Using data collected from 
annual reports of Chinese listed firms in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Markets 
from 2003 to 2005, I find that government-controlled companies are more likely to 
use market-based methods than others. It is consistent with the hypothesis that 
ownership has an impact on the choice of transfer pricing methods. The results also 
show that when the chairman of the board and the CEO of the company is the same 
person, companies are more likely to use cost-based methods. However, inconsistent 
with my hypothesis, the results indicate that firms with small boards are more likely 
to choose cost-based methods than firms with large boards. This study extends prior 
research on transfer pricing by focusing on the impact of corporate governance. 
Furthermore, this study suggests that regulators might limit transfer pricing 
manipulations by stipulating a firm’s corporate governance structure. This research 
also draws both regulators’ and investors’ attention to the impact of corporate 
governance on transfer pricing methods. 
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The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Choice of Transfer 
Pricing Methods in China 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
Related party transactions (RPTs) are one of the recurring areas of concern 
raised by recent corporate scandals. Prior studies show that controlling shareholders 
misappropriate profits of firms in emerging markets (Lo et al., 2007; Jian and Wong, 
2003). Through RPTs, cash and profits are diverted away from firms in a group 
either to controlling shareholders’ pockets directly or to their loss-making associates. 
It has been shown that firms in developed markets also use RPTs to transfer assets 
and profits out of firms for the benefit of those who control them (Johnson et al., 
2000).  
Such income shifting of RPTs can be reduced by proper corporate governance 
mechanisms (Gordon et al., 2004). Corporate governance helps to reduce the 
information asymmetry between external investors and internal management. If 
external capital markets could perfectly observe managers’ investment actions and 
effort, there would be no need for corporate governance mechanisms to help monitor 
managers, and the investor can assure themselves of getting a maximized return of 
their investments.  The existing literature has found certain board characteristics 
and chief executive officer (CEO) pay-performance sensitivity to be useful 
governance mechanisms in ameliorating managerial agency problems (Fama and 
Jenson, 1983; Fama 1980; Kelin, 2002a; Bushman et al., 2004a). For example, the 
percentage of independent director on the board has been found to be positively 
correlated with firm value and interpreted as indicative of good corporate governance 
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(Bushman et al., 2004b; Fama and Jenson, 1983) 
Early research on pricing of RPTs (i.e. transfer pricing) in multinational 
companies focused primarily on issues relating to international taxation allocation 
(e.g., Chan and Chow, 1997a; Jacob, 1996). However, with the growth of the 
economy, especially the growth of business groups, transfer pricing has acquired a 
broader significance. Some companies take advantage of transfer pricing to 
manipulate their financial statements (i.e. inflate earnings) and shift income among 
affiliated listed companies. For example, in order to inflate the earnings of a listed 
company, a parent company or affiliated company may sell goods at very low price 
to the listed company and then the listed company sells it to the market at a higher 
price.  This has become a prominent phenomenon in the stock market (Hua, 2002).  
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is also aware of earnings 
manipulation through transfer pricing. Consequently, the CSRC revised the 
“Guideline on the Management of Listed Companies” on 7 January 2002which 
explicitly mandates the conditions for conducting a related party transaction, and the 
disclosure requirements.  Relevant section of the guideline (i.e., Section 3) is 
summarized in Appendix 1.   
    This paper addresses possible abuses of transfer pricing methods in China where 
such dealings are prevalent because of prevalent corporate structures, economic 
institutions and the legal system. Jian and Wong (2003) show some evidence that 
controlling shareholders use RPTs to manage earnings. They find that 90 percent of 
Chinese listed firms are involved in different degrees of RPTs and use recurring 
related party sales to manage earnings in order to meet government ROE 
requirements for rights issues or to avoid being delisted. Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that the current corporate governance system in China fails to constrain 
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controlling shareholders from manipulating earnings and expropriating minority 
shareholders through RPTs1. 
In this study, I would like to focus on whether companies with different 
corporate governance mechanisms have different preferences for transfer pricing 
methods in RPTs.  There are two common types of transfer pricing methods, 
market-based methods and cost-based methods. Market-based methods are based on 
fair market prices, which are less susceptible to manipulation. Cost-based methods 
are basically determined by internally generated data, and this is easier to manipulate 
(MaAulay and Tomkins, 1992; Merville and Petty, 1978; Thomas, 1971; Anthony 
and Dearden, 1980; Cook, 1995; Granick, 1975). Therefore, companies tend to use 
cost-based methods to manage their earnings through RPTs.  As such, this study 
focuses on answering the following question: How is the choice of transfer pricing 
methods (i.e., cost-based or market-based) in related party transactions affected by 
characteristics of the company, such as ownership of the company (e.g., 
government-controlled or others) or board characteristics (e.g., the percentage of 
inside directors, dual CEO/chair position)? 
In this paper, I test the hypotheses by analyzing 4,515 RPTs conducted by 
Chinese listed firms over the period from 2003 to 2005. The results indicate that (i) 
non-government-controlled companies and (ii) the companies with the same person 
acting as the CEO and chairman of the board are more likely to choose cost-based 
transfer pricing methods, which are consistent with the hypothesis. However, 
inconsistent with my hypothesis, I find that companies with small board size are 
more likely to use cost-based transfer pricing methods and percentage of independent 
                                                        
1 A well-known example in China is Sanjiu Medicine (0999). The controlling shareholder (Sanjiu Group) and 
other related parties owed 2.5 billion RMB (96% of the company’s total assets) to the listed company.  They 
seriously expropriated minority shareholders’ interest. CSRC circulated a notice of criticism towards Sanjiu 
Medicine.  
(CSRC website: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n575742/n2529771/2608081.html). 
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directors on the board do not have a significant impact on the choice of pricing 
methods. The results are robust after controlling for industry, firm size, preferential 
income tax rate, and amounts of RPT. 
As far as I understand, there is no prior research that examines how corporate 
governance affects management decisions on transfer pricing methods. Thus, this 
study enriches the extent literature on moral hazard behavior2 as a consequence of 
dysfunctional corporate governance.  My research shows that firm that has weak 
corporate governance are more likely to employ cost-based pricing methods for 
earnings manipulation. Thereby, this study provides further evidence for disguised 
moral hazard behavior resulting from dysfunctional corporate governance.   
Furthermore, this study provides policy implications that facilitate regulators’ 
efforts to control the abuse of RPTs through corporate governance mechanisms and 
regulation of pricing methods. By specifying the corporate organizational structure 
and corporate governance practice, the regulators can efficiently reduce transfer 
pricing manipulation without further incurring additional monitoring and disclosure 
cost. For example, the results provide empirical evidence that 
non-government-controlled and Chairman-CEO duality firms are more likely to 
choose cost-based pricing methods and these firms are considered to have poor 
corporate governance. Regulators can draw up some rules specifically towards firms 
who have those characteristics. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews relevant 
literature on transfer pricing methods and corporate governance. Section 3 presents 
the institutional background of transfer pricing in Chinese listed companies. Section 
4 lays out the research hypotheses. Section 5 describes the research methodology. 
                                                        
2 Practically, the moral hazard behavior can be broadly classified into four categories: insufficient effort, 
extravagant investments, entrenchment strategies and self-dealing (Tirole, 2006). RPTs can be used for 
self-dealings. 
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Finally, Section 6 discusses the empirical findings and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Institutional Background  
Before we develop our hypothesis, it is necessary to briefly recount the 
institutional background of China’s listed company and China’s stock market since 
the development of China’s stock distincts from most of the capital markets around 
the world. 
 
2.1 Ownership structure 
Under China’s economic reform, state-owned enterprises were restructured. The 
reform decentralized management decision rights from the government to its 
state-owned firms, while allowing the government to remain as the controlling 
owner. 
One of the purposes of creating a capital market in China was to improve 
state-owned enterprise’s corporate governance. Under the previous planned 
economic system, state-owned enterprises acted simply as manufacturing plants 
executing government orders. The state expected that going public would facilitate 
the restructuring of state-owned enterprises and that a well-functioning corporate 
governance system would be established. In reality, although a huge volume of funds 
was raised through the stock market, corporate governance remained an unsolved 
problem. There are two key aspects of corporate governance issues affecting the 
Chinese stock market, namely relationships between listed subsidiaries and parent 
companies and ownership concentration. 
i) Listed subsidiaries and parent companies 
Born out of a central command economy that is now in a transition period, the 
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Chinese stock market and Chinese listed companies reflect some of the serious 
weaknesses of their macro-environment. The low-quality corporate governance in 
listed companies can be traced back to these weaknesses.  
One of the main characteristics of Chinese listed companies’ ownership 
structure is usually the existence of parent companies. It is a common practice in 
developed stock markets for large groups to be entirely publicly held, but in China, a 
listed company will often be a subsidiary of an unlisted business group. After 
witnessing the success of the Japanese Keiretsus and the Korean Chaebols in the 
1970s and 1980s, the Chinese government has encouraged the establishment of 
corporate groups (Keister, 2000). The government has formed bureaus to assemble 
firms in similar industries or closely related industries, facilitate them to develop 
trades and other relations, and build their administrative structures. Therefore, driven 
by government directions and economic forces, some large corporate groups were 
developed in the 1980s and 1990s from primarily state-owned enterprises affiliated 
with the central government or local governments. 
State-owned business groups often carve out their most profitable business units 
for a public offering, in order to meet IPO requirements and achieve a higher IPO 
price (Aharnoy et al., 2000). The original enterprise, consisting of the remaining 
unprofitable units, then becomes the parent company of the newly listed company. 
Usually, the same team controls the board and management of both the listed 
company and its parent company, and the listed company is under the absolute 
control of its parent, since only a small proportion of shares are traded in the market. 
The listed company is viewed by its parent as a platform for financing in the stock 
market and a cash vehicle for the whole group’s internal capital market (Srinidhi et 
al., 2004). Since the parent company is not listed, there is little or no information on 
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the parent publicly available to investors. 
Chen et al. (2003) find that rather than using the popular Western technique of 
accruals, most listed Chinese firms manage their earnings though real transactions, 
for instance by providing credit to a risky client or by RPTs such as a sale of fixed 
assets to their parent companies. 
ii) Ownership concentration 
Another characteristic of the ownership structure of Chinese listed firms is the 
restrictions on share transfer. There are various classes of shares in China and most 
of them are non-tradable. 
a. State-owned shares: shares obtained by a state institution in exchange for a 
capital contribution made by that institution to a corporation. 
b. Domestic legal-person shares: sponsor’s3 shares held by domestic legal 
persons. 
c. Foreign legal-person shares: sponsor’s shares held by foreign legal persons. 
d. Private placement of legal-person shares: shares issued by private placement 
and subscribed by legal persons other than sponsors. 
e. Employee shares: shares held by company staff, issued by private placement 
of companies and yet not listed at the current time.  
State-owned shares are held by central and local governments, which are 
represented by local financial bureaus, state asset management companies, or 
investment companies. State-owned shares can also be held by the parent of the listed 
company, typically a state-owned enterprise. They are not tradable. Domestic 
institutions such as industrial enterprises, securities companies, trust and investment 
companies, foundations and funds, banks, construction and real estate development 
companies, transportation and power companies, and technology and research 
                                                        
3 The term of ‘sponsor’ is used to refer to an initial investor/subscriber. 
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institutes hold legal person shares. These institutions are further classified according 
to their ownership structures as state-owned enterprises, state-owned nonprofit 
organizations, collectively owned enterprises, private enterprises, joint stock 
companies, and foreign-funded companies. Legal person shares are not tradable. 
State-owned and legal person shares can be transferred to domestic institutions upon 
approval of the CSRC. As to employee shares, companies may sell such shares to 
management and employees, typically at a significant discount, at the time of going 
public. These shares have to be held for 6 to 12 months after an IPO, and can then be 
sold on the stock exchanges following approval by the securities regulatory 
authorities. In 1998 the regulatory authorities issued a circular ruling that the 
issuance of employee shares should be discontinued. As a result, the number of 
employee shares is gradually falling. 
Publicly traded shares, the only shares actually traded in mainland China, 
account for less than one-third of the total shares in existence. Ding et al. (2005) 
calculate the proportion of negotiable shares to total equity for all listed companies at 
the end of 2003. They find out that more than four-fifths of those companies’ 
majority shares are not tradable.  
A survey appearing in the book titled “Corporate Governance and Enterprise 
Reform in China: Building the Institutions of Modern Markets” (Tenev et. al., 2002) 
shows that a similarity shared by ownership structures of some West European 
companies and East Asian firms is the mutual ownership among different companies. 
In terms of types of largest shareholders, China is differentiated by the absence of 
significant ownership by individuals and families, the negligible role of financial 
institutions and institutional investors, and the large state role. These features have a 
direct bearing on the types of corporate governance issues that China faces. Perhaps 
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the most important implication of the dominant role of state ownership in China’s 
listed companies is the control the government can exert over management 
appointments and incentives, and thereby over companies’ behavior.  
 
2.2 Related party transactions 
In 1997, the China Ministry of Finance, which serves as the accounting 
standards setter in China, issued an accounting standard for RPTs, “Related party 
transaction disclosure and its transactions” (hereafter, the RPT Standard), which 
requires publicly listed companies to disclose all material RPTs in the notes to the 
financial statements. Related parties, as defined by the RPT Standard, include the 
listed firm’s parent company, affiliated companies4, its management, board members, 
principal owners, or members of the immediate families of any of these groups. 
Listed companies should disclose all transactions including trading of goods, services 
or assets with related parties. Table 2 shows the types of RPTs that should be 
disclosed by Chinese listed firms. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
2.3 Corporate governance in China 
After entering the World Trade Organization, the government of the PRC has 
made some progress on corporate governance. According to the World Bank Group 
(1999), corporate governance is about maximizing value subject to meeting a 
corporation’s financial, legal, and contractual obligations. This inclusive definition 
stresses the need for boards of directors to balance the interests of shareholders with 
                                                        
4 No disclosure is required for RPTs with subsidiaries which are consolidated in financial statements. However, 
for affiliated companies which the listed company can exert significant influence over that are not consolidated 
(i.e. ownership between 20% and 50%), disclosures are required. 
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those of other stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, investors and 
creditors, in order to achieve long-term sustained value. Recognizing the importance 
of corporate governance to the continuous development of the Chinese capital 
markets, the CSRC promulgated a consultation paper, “Guiding Opinion for Listed 
Companies on the Establishment of Independent Non-Executive Directors Systems”, 
and the corresponding final version of “Guideline on the Management of Listed 
Companies” in 2001 and 2002 respectively. 
However, despite the CSRC’s admirable intentions and the comprehensive 
coverage of its Guideline, its effectiveness will depend very much on its practical 
implementation. Some of the practical problems that domestically listed companies 
may have with the corporate governance initiative are: 
i) Imprecise wording 
As the criteria for compliance with the Guideline are not clearly defined, there 
are plenty of grey areas and ambiguities that leave room to maneuver for companies 
who wish to abuse the system. For example, independent directors have been praised 
as guardians of corporate governance, and champions and protectors of minority 
shareholders. However, the Guideline and the Guideline Opinion for Listed 
Companies on the Establishment of an Independent Directors System are not clear on 
who actually has the power to appoint independent directors. If majority shareholders 
dominate the appointment of the independent directors, the whole board may still be 
effectively under the control of those majority shareholders. 
Secondly, although the CSRC has provided a detailed guideline for determining 
directors’ independence as stated in article 3, there are still some loopholes in the 
description. According to the world’s most influential Corporation Governance 
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Codes5, a company’s ex-employee can only be qualified as an independent director 
after a certain cooling off period. For example, a period of five years is required by 
the New York Stock Exchange and the California Public Employees Retirement 
System in the U.S., while three years are required by the Australian Stock Exchange. 
However, the CSRC guideline requires only a one-year break time for an 
ex-employee to be an independent director, which is far from the actual concept of 
being truly independent. The whole idea of introducing independent directors is to 
provide objective and independent judgment on management’s performance, without 
being influenced by the company’s management or major shareholders. But, after 
only one year of cooling off the ex-employee might still have some sort of loyalty or 
connection with the company, which makes it difficult for him/her to raise opposition 
or act tough on the managers.  
Thirdly, the CSRC guideline does not clearly specify whether a company’s 
current non-executive directors can switch to be independent directors. In China, a 
listed company has a certain number of non-executive outside directors, who either 
come from the firm’s controlling shareholders or other affiliations. For example, a 
director of a Chinese listed firm could simply be transferred and become an 
independent director in the following year. As a result, the company could then meet 
the CSRC’s requirement to have at least one-third of board members that are 
independent. Officially, this non-executive director may be qualified as an 
independent director, but by serving at the same firm and the same board for a certain 
period, how independent can he or she be? Furthermore, the minimum requirement 
of one-third independent directors is relatively low. For example, in the U.S., boards 
should be comprised of a substantial majority of “independent” directors. At a 
                                                        
5 For details, please refer to the official website of SEC about corresponding rules: 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm 
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minimum, these directors should meet the definition of “independent director” as 
given by the relevant non-official regulatory organizations standards6. According to a 
1999 survey conducted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, the average percentage of independent directors on companies’ board 
of directors was 62 percent in the U.S.. Therefore, the minimum requirement for the 
percentage of independent directors in China is comparatively quite low. 
ii) Immature corporate governance environment  
Unlike those in more mature securities markets, shareholders in the PRC stock 
markets polarize into majority and minority shareholders. Majority shareholders are 
typically very strong and individual minority shareholders are extremely weak, and 
there are only a few sophisticated institutional minority shareholders such as pension 
funds, mutual funds and financial institutions to counter the influence of the majority 
shareholders. Thus, under this immature corporate governance environment, 
opportunistic behavior is likely to occur through RPTs. 
                                                        
6 For example, CalPERs in April 13, 1999 promulgated the Corporate Governance Core Principles and Guidelines 
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3. Literature Review 
Previous empirical studies on transfer pricing in developing countries are quite 
limited, with most studies focusing on firms operating in the United States, Japan, 
and other major developed countries. Prior studies suggest that the governments of 
developing countries are more vulnerable than those of developed countries to 
transfer pricing abuse because of the lack of institutional frameworks and expertise 
and the inadequacy of resources to tackle this issue (Brean, 1979; Plasschaert, 1985; 
Rahman and Scapens, 1986).  
 
3.1 Factors affecting transfer pricing decisions and the choice of transfer pricing 
methods 
There is a wide diversity of transfer pricing practice for both domestic and 
international intra-corporate operations. Surveys by Emmanuel and Mehafdi (1994) 
show the diversity of transfer pricing methods and the multiplicity of policies used. 
They conclude the there are no universal or cure-all transfer prices. They also suggest 
that whether a company applies a market price, a cost price, or multiple pricing is not 
really the crux of the issue. What is more important is whether the transfer prices 
benefit the strategic and structural circumstances of the particular company, and 
reflect the operational realities of the divisions involved in the internal trade. 
Previous studies on transfer pricing mainly analyzed transactional corporations 
(i.e. TNCs) in the U.S. and other developed countries. Tang and Chan (1979) finds 
that the overall company profit is the primary factor affecting method choice and the 
determination of subsidiary performance is the most important objective. No 
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significant relationship between TNC size and transfer pricing method was found. 
Wu and Sharp (1979) find that transfer pricing criteria differ by industries for U.S. 
TNCs. Primary criteria include compliance with tax and tariff regulations and profit 
maximization. Burns (1980) identifies the most influential factors affecting transfer 
pricing decisions as market conditions and competition in the host country, 
reasonable profit for the subsidiary, and U.S. income tax regulations. Yunker (1982) 
finds that larger firms tend to use market-based methods. Important environmental 
factors include overall market conditions and demand for the product, government 
regulations and restrictions, and economic conditions. According to Borkowski 
(1992), there is no relationship between transfer pricing method and industry, and 
smaller TNCs prefer cost-based methods. In detail, the transfer pricing decisions are 
affected by tax and customs rates and regulations, and the relative ease of using the 
transfer pricing method. In a replication of his earlier study, Tang (1993) confirms his 
prior findings of no relation between TNC size and pricing methods. The 
environmental factors affecting method choice were overall TNC profit, tax rate and 
regulation differences, and restrictions on repatriation of profits. 
Chan and Chow (2001) investigated the international transfer pricing methods 
adopted by multinational corporations (MNCs) in China and how their choices are 
affected by corporate environments. This study adopts a structured interview 
methodology with the management of large foreign investment enterprises in China 
to obtain the data for testing the research hypotheses. A total of 64 useable responses 
were provided and included in the final sample. This study explains the impacts of 
corporate environments that are of particular relevance to the choice of transfer 
pricing methods in developing countries. The empirical results reveal that foreign 
investment enterprises having local partners' participation in management tend to use 
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market-based transfer pricing methods while foreign investment enterprises not 
having local partners' participation in management tend to use cost-based transfer 
pricing methods. The analysis also shows that two other corporate attributes, i.e. 
source of investment and activity orientation, are significant to the choice of transfer 
pricing methods when analyzed separately. Multivariate analysis reveals that the 
likelihood of adopting cost-based or market-based transfer pricing methods depends 
on both local partner's participation in management and the source of foreign 
investment of a foreign investment enterprise. 
Luft and Libby (1997) also aim to find the factors affecting the choice of 
transfer pricing methods. This paper focuses on the fairness of transfer pricing 
methods and reports case-based questionnaire responses. These responses indicate 
that transfer pricing negotiations expect fairness-based price concessions that 
moderate the influence of an outside market price when the outside market price 
strongly favors one of the parties. Motivated by this study, Kachelmeier and Towry 
(2002) investigate whether these expectations of fairness relate to the actual prices 
that result from real-cash negotiations. They perform an experiment with 48 M.B.A. 
student volunteers by distributing a transfer pricing case in two settings. In one 
setting, a computerized negotiation mechanism is used in which the only 
communications are bids, asks and acceptances. In the other setting, the parties 
negotiate face-to-face, with no restrictions on communication. The results indicate 
that expectations of fairness-based price concessions do not survive actual 
negotiations when participants negotiate in the first setting. Conversely, both 
expectations and actual negotiated outcomes reflect fairness-based price concessions 
when participants negotiate in the second setting. Kachelmeier and Towry’s (2002) 
findings imply that firms can influence the extent to which an outside market price 
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determines a negotiated internal transfer price by changing the means of negotiation. 
There are a few papers that focus on the effects of management’s perceptions 
and managerial autonomy on the choice of transfer pricing methods, such as Chan 
and Lo (2004), and Chan et al. (2006). Chan and Lo (2004) investigate the 
association between the management’s perception of the importance of 
environmental variables and its choice of international transfer pricing methods in 
the context of a developing country. Field interviews were conducted with the 
management of large foreign investment enterprises in China. These foreign 
investment enterprises included main investors from the U.S., Japan, and Europe. 
The results indicate that the more important management perceives the interests of 
local partners and the maintenance of a good relationship with the host government 
to be, the more likely that the foreign investment enterprise will use a market-based 
transfer-pricing method. On the other hand, the more important management 
perceives foreign exchange controls in transfer-pricing decisions, the more likely the 
foreign investment enterprise will choose a cost-based method. Overall, there is 
moderate agreement between U.S. and non-U.S. foreign investment enterprises on 
the relative importance of the environmental variables studied. Furthermore, Chan et 
al. (2006) examine the impact of managerial autonomy on tax compliance in an 
international transfer pricing context. They specially study whether foreign 
subsidiaries’ autonomy in making pricing and sourcing decisions on intra-firm 
transfers affect their profit shifting through international transfer pricing. They 
measure transfer pricing noncompliance in terms of tax audit adjustments made by 
tax authorities. Based on a sample of 163 transfer pricing audits on foreign 
investment enterprises in China, they find that tax audit adjustments for foreign 
investment enterprises that have autonomy in setting transfer prices or sourcing form 
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outsiders are smaller than those that have their transfer transactions dictated by 
parent companies. 
Other factors, such as inducing truthful forecasts of demand from buying units, 
may also affect the choice of transfer pricing methods. Shih (1996) notice that 
previous studies on transfer pricing have one common trait; they only report what 
firms do with regard to transfer pricing but do not delve into the rationales behind the 
practices. Shih (1996) take one extra step to test whether the strategic concern of 
inducing truthful forecasts of demand from buying units affects transfer pricing 
decisions. A questionnaire was sent to the controller, treasurer or financial 
vice-president (in order of preference) of each of the 400 largest Canadian firms. The 
results show recurring transfer relationships are less likely to be priced at variable 
cost than are non-recurring transfers. The result is consistent with the hypothesis that 
inducing truthful forecasts of demand from buying units at the capacity planning 
stage has a larger influence on pricing of long-term transfer relationships. 
In conclusion, there are number of factors affecting the choice of transfer 
pricing methods.  Tax minimization and earnings management are the two most 
common motivations for transfer pricing manipulation. Management characteristics 
and the external market environment also have significant effects on the choice of 
transfer pricing methods. This study, by relating choice of transfer pricing to 
corporate governance, identifies some factors affecting the transfer pricing decision 
that are not investigated by previous studies.   
3.2 Corporate Governance 
This study tries to identify the role of corporate governance in preventing 
management’s opportunistic behaviors (abuse of pricing methods in RPTs in this 
study) Before going to the hypotheses development, a brief summary on existing 
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corporate governance empirical findings will be explained. According to previous 
studies, corporate governance has been characterized as a set of mechanisms 
protecting investors from opportunistic behavior (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Dennis 
and McConnell, 2002). Although there is not direct measure on the strength of 
corporate governance, empirical regularities identify that board characteristics and 
ownership structures are indicative to corporate governance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003)  These mechanisms may be internal or external. Internal mechanisms include 
dispersed ownership structures, independent boards of directors, formal board 
processes, timely and accurate disclosure of relevant information, etc.; external 
mechanisms include the existence of active external take-over markets, a 
shareholder-friendly legal infrastructure, well-established capital markets, etc. This 
study investigates the impacts of two main internal governance mechanisms, 
ownership structures and board characteristics. 
 
3.2.1 Ownership 
A defining characteristic of China’s listed companies is the concentration of 
ownership. As stated by the Chinese government, the original purpose of the stock 
market is to help state-owned enterprises raise funds and improve their operating 
performance. For this historical reason, the majority of current listed Chinese 
companies originated from restructured state-owned enterprises and is still controlled 
by the State and/or other non-listed state-owned enterprises. Aharony et al. (2000) 
provides evidence that most of China’s newly listed firms are restructured from 
existing state-owned enterprises. Theoretically, ownership structure is one of the 
indispensable elements of corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) because 
large owners, via their voting rights, can effectively monitor and govern the 
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management team. However, recent developments in corporate governance theory 
have highlighted the conflict of interests that manifests through action being taken by 
the controlling shareholders for their own benefit, at the expense of minority 
shareholders, and this is called “tunneling” (Johnson et al., 2000). Because of such 
conflict of interests, some Chinese firms may have incentives to engage in RPTs with 
their parent companies and other affiliates. Ding et al. (2007) investigate the role 
played by a firm’s ownership structure in earnings management, with reference to the 
Chinese capital market. Analyzing 273 state-owned and privately-owned Chinese 
companies listed in 2002, they establish a link between firm’s ownership structure 
and earnings management practices. The results show that the entrenchment effect of 
ownership concentration on earnings management is weaker in privately-owned 
listed firms than in state-owned listed firms. Liu and Lu (2003) state that in China, 
most listed companies are spin-offs from large state-owned enterprises and, in most 
cases, they still share personnel functions, capital, and assets with their parent 
companies. Local governments, instead of shareholder committees, appoint the 
management of listed firms. Therefore, management often takes action to benefit the 
largest shareholder and seldom considers minority shareholders’ interests.  
Especially, in China, minority shareholders cannot take listed companies to court, 
because of limitations in the civil law and a lack of punishment spectrum in the 
current securities laws7. Listed companies, therefore, are susceptible to RPTs carried 
out for the benefit of the controlling shareholders. 
With regard to corporate governance to the RPTs, Jian and Wong (2003) discuss 
how RPTs can a) benefit the state-owned group companies as a whole including all 
its shareholders; and b) be used by controlling owners to expropriate assets from 
                                                        
7 For example, current Chinese securities laws do not allow proportionate legal enforcement. Regulators can only 
take extreme actions (prison sentences or warnings); they cannot impose moderate penalties.  
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minority shareholders. The study focuses on listed firms that engage in RPTs with 
their parent companies and affiliated entities such as subsidiaries of the parent 
companies. Jian and Wong (2003) find that the results are consistent with the notion 
that Chinese listed companies use recurring related party sales to manage earnings in 
order to meet the government’s ROE requirements for rights issues or to avoid being 
delisted. In addition, through related lending, listed companies divert resources they 
obtain from operations to their major shareholders and their affiliates. These earnings 
management and tunneling activities are more pronounced in state-owned 
group-controlled companies.   
 
3.2.2 Board characteristics 
The board of directors in principle monitors management on behalf of 
shareholders. Board characteristics are indicative to the functioning of board in 
carrying out their monitoring tasks. The board size and ratio of independent (outside) 
directors reflects a board’s monitoring power and independence, while the 
managerial duality gauge the discretionary power of management.  Byrd and 
Hickman (1992) intend to provide evidence on the importance of corporate boards by 
examining the relationship between the presence of outside directors and the returns 
to shareholders of bidding firms in tender offers. They examine 128 tender offer bids 
from 1980 through 1987 and classify outside directors as either independent from or 
having some affiliation with managers. The results show that bidding firms in which 
independent outside directors hold at least 50 percent of the seats have significantly 
higher announcement-date abnormal returns than other bidders, which indicates that 
independent boards benefit shareholders. They find evidence of a nonlinear 
relationship between the fraction of independent directors on a board and the 
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shareholder wealth effects of tender offer bids. This result implies that all categories 
of board members (i.e. managers, affiliated outside directors, and independent 
outside directors) play an important role in guiding the firm, but shareholders will 
not be best served by a board comprised entirely of outside directors. All results are 
lost if the traditional inside-outside board classification method is used.  
Beasley (1996) tests whether the proportion of outsiders on the board of 
directors is lower for firms experiencing financial statement fraud than for no-fraud 
firms. This study used a choice-based 75 fraud and 75 non-fraud firms selected from 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases and the Wall Street Journal Index. 
Results from the logit regression analysis show that no-fraud firms have boards with 
significantly higher percentages of outside members than those of fraud firms; 
however, the presence of an audit committee does not significantly affect the 
likelihood of financial statement fraud. The results also indicate when outside 
director ownership in the firm and outside director tenure on the board increase, and 
when the outside director holds less directorships in other firms, the likelihood of 
financial statement fraud decreases. 
DeChow et al. (1996) investigate the motives for and consequences of earnings 
manipulation in a sample of firms subject to accounting enforcement actions by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These firms are alleged to have 
violated generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) by overstating their 
reported earnings. They examine the ability of several previously suggested 
motivations for earnings manipulation to explain the behavior of firms in this sample. 
They also test whether the incidence of earnings manipulation in this sample is 
systematically related to weaknesses in the firms’ governance structures. Finally, they 
document the capital market consequences experienced by these firms after 
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allegations of earnings manipulation were made. They find that an important 
motivation for earnings manipulation is the desire to attract external financing at low 
cost. The results show that this motivation remains significant after controlling for 
contracting motives proposed in the academic literature. They also find that firms 
manipulating earnings are: (i) more likely to have boards of directors dominated by 
management; (ii) more likely to have a CEO who simultaneously serves as Chairman 
of the Board; (iii) more likely to have a CEO who is also the firm’s founder; (iv) less 
likely to have an audit committee; and (v) less likely to have an outside block 
shareholder. Finally, they document that those firms manipulating earnings 
experience significant increases in their costs of capital when the manipulations are 
made public. 
Using a sample of 692 publicly traded U.S. firm-years, Klein (2002b) examines 
whether the magnitude of abnormal accruals (a proxy of earnings management) is 
related to board or audit committee independence. The study is motivated by the 
implicit assertion by the SEC, the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ that 
earnings management and poor corporate governance mechanisms are positively 
related. Klein found that there is a cross-sectional negative association between 
board or audit committee independence and earnings management. When either the 
board or the audit committee has less than a majority of independent directors, the 
results are stronger (i.e., earnings management is more prevalent).  
Gordon et al. (2004) investigate the association between corporate governance 
mechanisms and RPTs. They used number of board members, percentage of 
executives on the board, CEO-Chairman duality, the annual cash retainer fee paid to 
board non-executive members, a dummy of director awarded stock, a dummy of 
director awarded options, and the total percentage of  shares owned by large outside 
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owners as the corporate governance variables. They estimate separate regressions for 
the three main governance mechanisms, namely, sensitivities of CEO compensation, 
board characteristics and outside monitors. The results show that compensation 
structure of directors, size of board, board independence, and percentage of shares 
held by the largest shareholders have significant impacts on the volume of RPTs.  
Their results indicate that shareholders do not benefit from, but in fact are harmed by 
RPTs, showing strong support for the conflict of interest hypothesis. Their paper 
examines the relationship among the RPTs measured by the number of RPTs various 
measures of corporate governance mechanisms and firm value. 
Berghe and Baelden (2005) examine the issue of independence as one element 
to improve board effectiveness. They focus on the monitoring role, and to a lesser 
extent on the strategic role of the board of directors. Their analysis of about 40 
corporate governance codes and recommendations with respect to the definition of 
independence has revealed two common characteristics. First, these definitions 
characterize independence mainly in a negative way by listing those elements that 
disqualify a director from being considered independent. Second, almost all 
definitions approach the concept of independence from a formal, structural point of 
view, in a sense that independence seems to equal freedom from any possible 
conflicts of interest, at all times. Instead of emphasizing independence, the paper 
hypothesizes that, to ensure board effectiveness, a board of directors is needed which, 
among other things, vigilantly monitors the company and institutes an objective 
decision-making process. Berghe and Baelden (2005) find out that three conditions 
have to be jointly fulfilled in order to achieve an efficient and integrated corporate 
governance: each director should have the ability as well as the willingness to be a 
critical thinker, with an independent mind; however, the environment should also 
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facilitate directors to acquiring this attitude. 
Davidson et al. (2005) explore whether the relationship between internal 
governance and earnings management holds in an institutional environment where 
corporate governance is less regulated and choice of governance mechanisms is 
voluntary. Their study involves a cross-sectional analysis of 434 firms listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange for the financial year ending in 2000. They examine 
internal governance mechanisms including the board of directors, the audit 
committee, the internal audit function and the choice of external auditor. Using 
absolute discretionary accruals to measure earnings management, they find that a 
lower level of earnings management is associated with the presence of non-executive 
directors on the board. They also find a negative association between earnings 
management and audit committees comprising a majority of non-executives, but no 
relationship between earnings management and committees comprised solely of 
non-executives. Their results do not support the hypothesis of a relationship between 
earnings management and the use of internal audit or the choice of a Big 5 auditor.  
The main objective of Farber (2005) is to examine whether there is an 
association between the detection of financial reporting fraud and subsequent 
improvements in the quality of governance mechanisms. Farber (2005) uses a sample 
of 87 firms identified by the SEC as fraudulently manipulating their financial 
statements. The results indicate that fraud firms have poor governance relative to a 
control sample in the year prior to fraud detection. Specially, fraud firms have fewer 
numbers and percentages of outside board members, fewer audit committee meetings, 
fewer financial experts on the audit committee, a smaller percentage of Big 4 
auditing firms, and a higher percentage of CEOs who are also chairmen of the board 
of directors. The study also examines whether improved governance influences 
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informed capital market participation. The results show that stock analysts are less 
likely to make earnings forecast for listed companies with financial fraud record, and 
the institutional shareholding is also significant lower for fraud firms than other firms.  
However, the results also indicate that firms that take actions to improve governance 
have superior stock price performance, even after controlling for earnings 
management. 
The objectives and findings of the corporate governance papers are summarized 
in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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4. Research Hypotheses 
As previously discussed, transfer pricing methods can be classified into two 
main categories, i.e. market-based methods and cost-based methods. Market-based 
methods use comparable market prices or adjusted market prices, which reflect the 
economy of internal transfers. According to previous studies, market prices are less 
easily manipulated and can minimize the disputes between managers of affiliates 
(Anthony and Dearden, 1980; Cook, 1995; Granick, 1975). They are also perceived 
to be more objective and fair, and are less likely to be challenged by tax authorities 
(Al-Eryani, 1987). Cost-based methods include actual full cost, standard full cost, 
actual variable cost, and standard variable cost. Using cost-based methods, 
companies can mark up the costs. If the company’s policy is to tie the mark-up to the 
prevailing market price, the transfer-pricing method is classified as a market-based 
method. If the policy is to determine the mark-up based on a desired rate of return on 
investment or capital, the transfer-pricing method is classified as a cost-based 
method (Chan and Lo, 2004; Chan and Chow, 1997b).  
Basically, cost-based methods are determined using available internal cost data. 
However, cost allocation is relatively easy to abuse, and determining a fair profit to 
add to cost is difficult (MaAulay and Tomkins, 1992; Merville and Petty, 1978; 
Thomas, 1971). Therefore, companies can make use of cost-based method to 
manipulate the transfer prices and their profits. On the other hand, when 
market-based methods are used, companies’ profits are hard to be manipulated. Prior 
studies find that good corporate governance can help to prevent or reduce earnings 
management (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; La Porta et al., 
1997; La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 2000). Therefore, I expect that companies 
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with good corporate governance would be less likely to manage earnings through 
transfer pricing manipulation and thus they are more likely to use market-based 
pricing methods. 
Previous studies document various characteristics of good corporate governance. 
Good corporate governance can resolve the conflict between owners and managers 
and between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Generally speaking, 
governance mechanisms can be classified into internal and external mechanisms. 
Internal corporate governance mechanisms include the ownership structure, 
executive compensation, the board of directors, financial disclosure, and so on. 
External mechanisms include the external takeover market, the legal infrastructure, 
and product market competition. Generally, for cross-country studies, external 
governance mechanisms may have a significant impact on earnings manipulation. 
My study focuses only on the impacts of the internal governance of Chinese 
companies since the regulatory framework faced by China listed firms is identical as 
mandated by CSRC, and the market for corporate control in China is immature and 
often motivated by political concerns rather than economic logic.  Prior studies find 
that ownership structure and board characteristics are the major indicators of a firm’s 
internal corporate governance structure (Beasley, 1996; Berghe and Baelden, 2005; 
Davidson et al., 2005; Klein, 2002b; Gordon et al., 2004; Bai et al., 2004; Liu and Lu, 
2003). 
 
4.1 Ownership 
Ownership is a crucial to internal governance mechanisms. A concentrated 
ownership structure allows the controlling shareholders to increase their 
shareholdings and control for minimal capital expense so that tunneling becomes 
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easier (Claessens et al., 2000). As discussed in Section 2, most Chinese listed 
companies are controlled by the Chinese government. The government is likely to 
have goals other than profit maximization, such as maintaining employment and 
social stability. Therefore, the government uses the listed companies as vehicles to 
achieve these policy goals even though by doing so, the shareholders’ wealth may be 
reduced (Bai et al., 2000). Bai et al. (2004) find that government ownership has a 
negative effect on firms’ market valuation.  Jian and Wong (2003) find that 
state-owned group-controlled companies are more likely to use recurring related 
party sales to manage earnings in order to meet the government’s ROE requirements 
for rights issues or to avoid being delisted.   
However, in the absence of due corporate governance and legal protection, large 
shareholders serve as alternative ways to the corporate governance and can assure the 
investors of getting a maximized return of their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
In many developing countries, state-ownership plays a similar monitoring role as the 
large shareholders in the firms. Some authors (e.g. Che, 1997), observing the role 
that firms formally owned by local authorities (so called township and village 
enterprises or TVEs) have played in China’s growth, argue that government 
ownership can serve as a commitment mechanism through which the government 
will restrain itself from rent seeking activities, and even offer support.  As such 
government ownership may have a positive effect on the firm’s value.  As 
government can directly support their firms, these firms may be less likely to manage 
earnings via transfer pricing manipulation and thus are more likely to use 
market-based transfer pricing methods.  Therefore, I develop the following 
hypothesis. 
H1: Government-controlled firms are more likely to use market-based transfer 
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pricing methods.  
 
4.2 Board Characteristics 
Board characteristics are a second instrument through which shareholders can 
exert influence on the behavior of mangers to ensure that the company is run 
according to their interests. Empirical findings on the relationship between board 
composition and firm performance are mixed. 
I consider the relationship between transfer-pricing method and three 
characteristics that have been viewed as indicators of board independence, including 
board size, percent of independent directors on the board and dual CEO/chair 
position. Prior studies mainly use these three board characteristics and audit 
committee independence as proxies for corporate governance. Because not all 
Chinese companies have established audit committees, studies on the independence 
of audit committees is not applicable in my study but I include a variable to identify 
the firms which have established audit committees as one of the sensitivity tests.  
Prior research contends that decision-making is more effective in small boards 
because having fewer people enhances the group’s collection, sharing and processing 
of information (Klein, 2002a; Bushman et al., 2004b; Yermack, 1996). Similarly, a 
smaller board’s monitoring ability and thus the corporate governance may be more 
effective. However, from a resource-dependent respective, a large corporate board 
with directors of diversified expertise performs effective monitoring and aids firms to 
get more resources (Pfeffer 1972, 1973)    Overall, the conclusion on the effect of 
board size on corporate governance is mixed. Therefore, I develop the second 
hypothesis as follows: 
H2: The number of the board of directors is related to the strength of corporate 
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governance, and the choice of pricing method in a related party transaction, while 
the sign of such relation cannot be predicted. 
 
In addition to its size, its composition is viewed as an indicator of a board’s 
monitoring effectiveness. While inside directors bring to the board expertise about 
the firm’s activities, it is the outside directors (i.e. independent directors) who serve 
as monitors and thereby mitigate agency problems (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Fama, 
1980). Therefore, the percentage of independent directors on the board (i.e. outsiders) 
is viewed as an indicator of board effectiveness. The lower the percentage of 
independent directors, the less independent the board is (Klein, 2002b; Bushman et 
al., 2004b, Fama and Jensen, 1983). If a board is less independent, its monitoring 
ability will decrease. Thus, it is more likely that opportunistic earnings management 
will occur. In order to manage earnings through RPTs, these sorts of companies 
should prefer cost-based transfer pricing methods.  Therefore, I develop the third 
hypothesis as follows: 
H3: The lower the percentage of independent directors a company has, the more 
likely that cost-based transfer pricing methods will be adopted. 
 
Another indicator of board independence is the dual role of chairman and CEO. 
A board that has a CEO who is also the chairman is viewed as less independent and 
is considered as a weaker monitor (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Weaker monitoring 
usually makes opportunistic earnings management through transfer pricing in RPTs 
possible. For example, the CEO/Chairman may have high incentive to maximize his 
dividend by minimizing taxation by shifting profits from high tax jurisdictions to low 
tax jurisdictions through transfer pricing manipulation. He/she may also simply 
inflate company’s reported income by transfer pricing decisions. A CEO/Chairman 
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can also transfer assets from related parties to his own pocket through trading with 
the company. Therefore, cost-based pricing methods will be more likely to be used if 
the CEO/Chairman wants to engage in tunneling and propping (i.e., a negative 
tunneling)8. Therefore, I develop the fourth hypothesis as follows: 
H4: If the CEO of a company is also the Board chairman, it is more likely that 
cost-based transfer pricing methods will be used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
8 For the definition and cases for propping in an emerging market, please refer to Friedman et al. 2003 "Propping 
and tunneling" Journal of comparative economics 31 732-750  
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5 Research Methodology 
5.1 Data collection 
My sample includes all companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
markets from 2003 to 2005. Before 2003, the issue of the revised Guideline on the 
Management of Listed Companies, there is no statute governing the disclosure 
practice on RPTs and thus I select RPT cases after 2003 to insure the data reliability. 
Date including pricing methods, types of RPTs, and relations between related parties, 
industry, ownership structures, and board characteristics were collected from annual 
reports and the research databases CSMAR and WIND. Companies with missing 
information are excluded from the sample. The original sample consists of 13,267 
firm-year observations. I select observations that relate to the trading of goods with 
the parent company in my final sample. “Trading of goods” is the major type of 
RPTs and market prices are more likely to be available for this kind of transaction. 
As such, the firm has a choice between market-based and cost-based pricing methods 
based on their incentives for earnings manipulation.  In addition, excluding 
related-party transactions with parties other than parent companies can help to assure 
that each firm will only be included in the sample once for a year.  Besides, as 
parent companies have more power to affect the listed firms’ decisions and previous 
studies show that parent companies have a high incentive to shift profits out from the 
listed firms (Jian and Wong, 2003; Gordon et al., 2004), I can investigate the impact 
of ownership on transfer pricing decisions by including this type of transaction. 
Finally, my sample consists of 4,515 firm-year observations after restricting the type 
of transactions and the type of related parties. 
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5.2 Regression Model 
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, I use logistic regression 
analysis to test the hypotheses (Norusis, 1999).The logistic regression model is as 
follows:  
PM = α0 + α1GOV+ α2#BOD + α3%ID +α4DUAL + α5HIGH_TECH +  
α6RPT/SALES + α7LN_ASSET + α8YEAR1 + α9YEAR2 + 
α10MARKET + ε 
where: 
PM = 1 if cost-based methods are used; 0 otherwise 
GOV = 1 if the company is government-controlled; 0 otherwise 
#BOD = number of board members 
%ID = percentage of independent directors on the board 
DUAL = 1 if the chairman and an executive of the company is the same 
person; 0 otherwise 
Control Variable: 
HIGH_TECH = 1 if the company is in a high-tech industry; 0 otherwise 
RPT/SALES = the amount of related party transaction divided by sales 
LN_ASSET = natural logarithm of total asset 
YEAR1 = 1 if the year is 2003; 0 otherwise 
YEAR2 = 1 if the year is 2004; 0 otherwise 
MAEKET =1 if the firm is listed on Shanghai Stock Market; 0 otherwise 
 
5.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, PM, is used to differentiate transfer pricing methods 
used for the RPTs. PM is a dummy variable that is set equal to 1 if cost-based 
methods are used and 0 otherwise. The most commonly used cost-based pricing 
methods include the cost-plus method 9  and profit split method 10 . The most 
                                                        
9 A price as determined by cost-plus method is the cost of the product plus an appropriate mark-up. 
10 A price as determined by the profit split method is calculated b making a reasonable allocation of a controlled 
group’s combined profit for related transactions with reference to the relative value of each company’s 
contribution to the combined profit. 
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commonly used market-based pricing methods include uncontrolled price11 and 
national regulated price12. 
 
5.2.2 Policy Variable 
The first variable, GOV, is a dummy variable that is set equal to 1 if the largest 
shareholder (ultimate shareholder) is a local government, state government or 
government agency such as the State Asset Management Bureau. With respect to the 
hypothesis, government-controlled firms are more likely to adopt market-based 
methods. Thus, the estimated coefficient on GOV is expected to be negative. 
As previously discussed, the variables #BOD, %ID and Dual represent board 
characteristics typically considered indicators of the quality of corporate governance. 
The variable #BOD is defined as the number of board members. Empirical studies 
have found that, ceteris paribus, companies with large boards have weak corporate 
governance. As I expect that companies with weak corporate governance are more 
likely to adopt cost-based pricing methods, the estimated coefficient on #BOD is 
expected to be positive. The variable %ID is defined as the percentage of 
independent directors on the board. Ceteris paribus, when the percentage of 
independent directors on the board is low, corporate governance should be weaker.  
I expect that cost-based methods are more likely to be used in companies with lower 
%ID; consequently, the estimated coefficient on %ID should be negative. DUAL is 
set equal to 1 when the company has the same person acting as CEO and Chairman 
of the board; and 0 otherwise. Ceteris paribus, when the chairman and chief 
                                                        
11 Uncontrolled price can be determined by internal prices or external prices.  A price as determined by the 
internal uncontrolled price is the price that would be appropriate to a comparable transaction between the 
company and unrelated party (i.e., the market price for non-related-party transactions). A price as determined by 
the external uncontrolled price is the open market price between an unrelated buyer and seller. 
12 National regulated price is the price determined by the state government for certain restricted products.   
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executive of a company are the same person, corporate governance should be 
relatively weak. I expect that companies with the same person acting as the CEO and 
board chairman are more likely to use cost-based methods. Thus, the coefficient on 
Dual is expected to be positive. 
 
5.2.3 Control variables 
I include six control variables, HIGH_TECH, RPT/SALES, LN_ASSET, 
YEAR1, YEAR2 and MARKET, in the regression model to control for the effects of 
firm and transaction characteristics on transfer pricing methods.  
I add HIGH_TECH to control for firm industry. HIGH_TECH is set equal to 1 
when the company is in a high-tech industry; and 0 otherwise. HIGH_TECH is 
defined according to the American Electronic Association’s high-tech definition 
under the North American Industrial Classification System. If the industry of a 
company is in the list of the American Electronic Association’s high-tech definition, 
HIGH_TECH is coded 1; otherwise HIGH_TECH will be set equal to 0.  As market 
price may be less likely to be available for high-tech products, a high-tech company 
will be more likely to adopt cost-based pricing methods. Thus, the coefficient of 
HIGH_TECH is expected to be positive.  HIGH_TECH can also control for the 
impact of taxation on the transfer pricing decisions. In China, high-tech companies 
usually enjoy preferential tax rates and thus companies can minimize their group tax 
liabilities by shifting income into the listed companies which enjoy a reduced tax rate. 
Therefore, cost-based transfer pricing methods are more likely to be used by 
high-tech companies. 
RPT/SALES is the amount of RPT divided by sales of the company. 
RPT/SALES is intended to measure the relative amount of RPTs, which may affect 
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the choice of transfer pricing method (the logic here is not adequately explained). To 
control for firm size, I include LN_ASSET (i.e., natural logarithm of firms’ total 
asset). Finally, to control for any possible effect of year and location of stock market 
on the pricing decisions, I include YEAR1, YEAR2 and MARKET as the control 
variables to control for unobserved time effect and location effect respectively. 
YEAR1 is set equal to 1 when RPTs occurred in 2003 and 0 otherwise. YEAR2 is set 
equal to 1 when RPTs occurred in 2004 and 0 otherwise. MARKET is set equal to 1 
when the company is listed on Shanghai Stock Market, and it is set equal to 0 when 
the company is listed on Shenzhen Stock Market. 
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6. Empirical Findings 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3, Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the dependent variables in my 
regression, and Panel B provides statistics for the independent variables related to 
corporate governance. The frequency of RPTs in each section is quite stable from 
2003 to 2005. Panel A shows that in my final sample the majority (at least 73 percent) 
of transactions use market-based pricing methods from 2003 to 2005. This 
observation is consistent with the fact transaction involving tangible assets are 
usually based on market-based pricing methods. Overall, panel B shows that 
approximately 80 percent of the RPTs in the sample are conducted by 
government-controlled firms and about 20 percent are conducted by “other” firms. 
Panel B also indicates that only approximately 7 percent of RPTs occurred in firms in 
which the CEOs and Chairmen of the board are the same person. As duality indicates 
weak governance (Gorden et al., 2004), the frequency of CEO/Chairman duality 
raises concerns regarding corporate governance in Chinese listed companies. The 
mean number of board members in the sample is 9.77 and the average percentage of 
independent directors is around 34 percent. 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
In Table 4, the univariate test in Panel A reports the effects of type of ownership 
on the choice of transfer pricing methods. A chi-square statistics is reported for 
testing whether the variables of interest are statistically independent or associated 
since the variables are categorical (Michael, 2001). The percentages of transactions 
that were market-based were 80.28 percent and 74.52 percent for 
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government-controlled and other companies, respectively, a difference that is 
statistically significant (Chi-square = 19.336, significant at 1 percent level). This 
result is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Table 4, Panel B shows the distribution of 
RPTs between Dual and Non-Dual firms. The percentages of cost-based RPTs in 
Dual and Non-Dual companies are 32 percent and 21 percent respectively, a 
difference which is also statistically significant. This is consistent with my 
expectation that firms with CEO/Chairman duality are more likely to adopt 
cost-based pricing methods. However, inconsistent with my expectation, Table 4, 
Panel C indicates that firms that have larger board sizes are more likely to use 
market-based methods. Panel D shows that firms with a lower percentage of 
independent directors on the board are more likely to use market-based methods but 
this finding is not statistically significant.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
Table 5 presents Spearman’s correlations among all variables. Most of the 
correlations are below 0.50. The generally modest correlations suggest the 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem in the regression analysis. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
6.2 Regression results 
Table 6 shows the results of the main regression analysis. The overall percentage 
of companies correctly classified is 78.3 percent and the model is significant at the 1 
percent level, which indicates a very strong relationship between the dependent 
variable and independent variables. Consistent with my expectations of H1, 
Government is negatively significant at the 1 percent level. That means 
government-controlled companies are more likely to use market-based pricing 
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methods.  The results also show that Dual is positively significant at the 1 percent 
level which support my hypothesis H4 (i.e., companies with the same person acting as 
the CEO and the chairman are more likely to adopt cost-based pricing methods). This 
result supports the view that state ownership as a presence of large shareholder, can 
effectively monitor the management behavior in the absence of due legal protection 
of investors and due corporate governance as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
and Perotti (2003).  
The #BOD variable is statistically significant at the 1 percent level., Thus, firms 
with smaller board sizes are more likely to use cost-based methods.  This result 
supports the resource-dependent theory on board size which I mentioned earlier. The 
presence of board directors with diversified expertise performs effective monitoring 
task (Pfeffer, 1972, 1973). This result may also due to fact that small board size is 
characterized with low democracy in China and the boards’ decisions may be easily 
influenced by one or two board members.  For the firm with a larger board size, the 
management needs to convince more board members that cost-based transfer pricing 
methods rather than market-based methods should be used. However, the result is 
inconsistent with hypothesis 3. The coefficient of %ID is not statistically 
significant13. The reason for this may be due to the fact that there is no great 
variation in terms of proportion of independent directors among the sample firms. 
Other reason for these results may be that independent directors are less efficient in 
developing countries than those in developed countries. Section 2 mentioned some 
loopholes of the regulation of independent directors. The independent directors in 
Chinese listed companies might not be really “independent”. In this case, the 
                                                        
13 I replace the variable %ID by a dummy variable for classifying firms which have percentage of independent 
directors above and below the median instead of using the actual percentage. The results are similar to the 
original model and the coefficient of the new dummy variable is not significant, and the results are not reported 
here. 
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percentage of independent directors may not reflect a true enhancement of corporate 
governance.    
(Insert Table 6 here) 
 
6.3 Sensitivity analysis 
I conducted additional tests to check the robustness of the regression results. 
First, I used an alternative definition of HIGH_TECH and replaced the variable 
HIGH_TECH by HIGH_TECHa, a dummy variable that is set equal to 1 if the 
company enjoys a high-tech preferential tax rate and 0 otherwise. The results, shown 
in Table 7, Column a, are essentially the same as those reported in Table 6. Second, I 
replaced the variable HIGH_TECH by HIGH_TECHb, a discrete dummy variable 
representing whether the subsidiaries of the firms have preferential tax rates. If one 
of the subsidiaries of the company has a high-tech preferential tax rate, 
HIGH_TECHb is coded as 1. If none of the subsidiaries of the company has 
high-tech preferential tax rate, HIGH_TECHb is coded 0. As shown in Table 7 
(Column b), the results are similar to the original model and GOV, #BOD and DUAL 
remain statistically significant. 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
Third, as some papers study the impact of audit committees on corporate 
governance, I add a dummy variable, AUDIT, in the original model. AUDIT is set 
equal to 1 if the firm has established an audit committee and 0 otherwise. The 
coefficient of AUDIT is insignificant and DUAL becomes not significant. 
(Insert Table 8 here)  
Fourth, I exclude the firms that use national regulated prices in my sample. This 
reduces the sample size to 4,279. In China, the state government exercises significant 
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control on the pricing of certain necessities.  Therefore, the firms may have no 
autonomy on their pricing decisions for these regulated products.  Table 9 reports 
the results of this sensitivity test and shows that, similar to the original regression, 
the three policy variables, GOV, #BOD and DUAL are significant at 1 percent level.  
(Insert Table 9 here) 
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7. Conclusion  
This study, based on a logit model, investigates the effects of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the choice of transfer pricing methods (cost-based vs. 
market-based) for RPTs. The results indicate that the type of ownership, board size 
and duality of the role of CEO and board chairman have significant impacts on 
transfer pricing decisions. I find that government-controlled firms, firms with large 
board size and firms with different persons acting as the CEO and board chairman 
are more likely to use market-based transfer pricing methods. Overall, the empirical 
results enrich the existing corporate governance literature. By deliberately choice of 
pricing methods, the related party transactions can be used by management as 
self-dealings, propping up earnings, tunneling corporate asset for management’s own 
interests. This study corroborates the extant theory that how corporate governance 
deals with the agency problem, containing the opportunistic management behavior 
(abuse of RPTs in this study).  
 Moreover, the results have important implications for public policy makers. As 
the independent variables in the model are governance characteristics, public policy 
makers can encourage firms to improve their corporate governance and reduce the 
abuse of RPTs. Promulgation of “Guideline on the Management of Listed 
Companies” indicates that the regulatory body is determined to ameliorate the 
corporate governance practice of listed companies. The Chinese government can, for 
example, encourage the listed companies to increase the board size and employ 
different persons acting as the CEO and board chairman to reduce the risk of transfer 
pricing manipulation.  
There are some limitations that may affect the reliability of the results. For 
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example, I assume that the details of RPTs and the pricing methods disclosed by the 
companies are accurate because they are audited by external auditors. However as 
RPTs are difficult to audit, there are risks that the information disclosed is not true 
and fair. Besides, as listed companies increasingly realize the importance and benefit 
of observing the revised “Guideline on the Management of Listed Companies” and 
make further progress in their corporate governance practice, a revisit of this issue 
might generate some interesting findings. 
TABLE 1. Literature Review of Corporate Governance 
 
Policy Variables Paper Objectives 
Ownership Structure Board Characterisitics 
  Governme
nt- 
controlled
% of 
largest 
shareholder
’s share 
% of top 
executives’ 
share 
Size of 
board 
Board 
independence
CEO- 
Chairman 
Duality 
Directors 
Compen- 
sation 
Audit 
committee 
independence 
Bai et al. 
(2004) 
To investigate the 
relationship between 
governance mechanisms and 
the market valuation of 
publicly listed firms in 
China 
Y*14 Y Y  Y Y*   
Beasley 
(1996) 
To test whether the inclusion 
of larger proportions of 
outside members on the 
board of directors 
significantly reduces the 
likelihood of financial 
statement fraud  
 
    Y* Y  Y 
Byrd and 
Hickman 
（1992） 
To examine the association 
between the presence of 
outside directors and the 
returns to share holders of 
bidding firms in tender 
offers 
    Y*    
                                                        
14 *: the results of these variables are significant. 
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TABLE 1. Literature Review of Corporate Governance (continued) 
  
Policy Variables Paper Objectives 
Ownership Structure Board Characteristics 
  Governmen
t- 
controlled 
% of 
large 
shareh
older’s 
share 
% of top 
executives’ 
share 
Size of 
board 
Board 
independen
ce 
CEO- 
Chairman 
Duality 
Directors 
Compen-
sation 
Audit 
committee 
independence 
Davison 
et al. 
(2005) 
To explore whether the internal 
governance-earnings management 
relationship holds in an institutional 
environment where corporate 
governance is less regulated and 
choice of governance mechanisms is 
voluntary 
 Y   Y* Y  Y 
DeChow 
and 
Sweeney 
(1996) 
To investigate the motives for, and 
consequences of, earnings 
manipulation in a sample of firms 
subject to accounting enforcement 
actions by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).  
 
    Y  Y Y 
DeFond 
et al. 
(2005) 
to test whether market participants 
react favorably when firms 
announce the appointment of a 
financial expert to their audit 
committee 
       Y* 
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TABLE 1. Literature Review of Corporate Governance (continued) 
  
Policy variables Paper Objectives 
Ownership Structure Board Characteristics 
 % of large 
shareholder’s 
share 
% of top 
executives’ 
share 
Government- 
controlled 
Size 
of 
board
Board 
indepen
dence 
CEO- 
Chairman 
Duality 
Directors 
Compen-
sation 
Audit 
committee 
independence 
Farber 
(2005) 
To examine the association 
between the credibility of 
the financial reporting 
system and the quality of 
governance mechanisms 
    Y* Y*  Y 
Gordon et 
al. (2004) 
To examine the relation of 
RPTs with corporate 
governance mechanisms 
and their association with 
firm value 
Y* Y  Y* Y* Y* Y*  
Klein 
(2002b) 
To examine whether audit 
committee and board 
characteristics are related 
to earnings management 
by the firm 
 Y   Y*   Y* 
Liu and Lu 
(2003) 
To examine whether 
earnings management in 
China’s listed companies is 
mainly induced by 
controlling owners’ 
tunneling activity 
Y* Y* Y  Y Y*   
Table 2. Major Types of RPTS that Publicly Listed Firms Must Disclose 
in China 
 
 Type of related party 
transactions 
Description 
1 Trade of goods Transactions which involve sales or 
purchases of goods between a listed 
company and its related party. 
2 Trade of services Transactions which involve sales or 
purchase of services between a listed 
company and its related party. 
3 Trade of assets other than 
goods 
Transactions which involve sales or 
purchase of assets other than goods 
between a listed company and its related 
party. Machinery and buildings are 
typical examples of other assets. 
4 Leases Operation or capital leases between a 
listed company and its related party. 
5 Loans Loans provided by (to) a listed company 
to (by) its related party (combining 
principal and interest revenue or 
expenses). 
6 Commissions Commissions paid (received) by a listed 
company to (from) its related party for 
providing agency services. 
7 Overhead reimbursement Fees paid by (received by) a listed 
company for obtaining (providing) 
administrative services from (to) its 
related party. 
8 Transfer of R&D Transactions which involve transfer of 
shared R&D projects between a listed 
company and its related party. 
9 Permits and franchises Transactions which involve permits or 
franchises between a listed company 
and its related party. 
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TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics on Variables 
 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable 
 
 
2003 2004 2005 Total (2003 to 2005) 
Pricing 
Method1
No. of 
PRTs 
% of 
the 
Sample 
No. of 
RPTs
% of 
the 
Sample
No. 
of 
RPTs
% of 
the 
Sample
No. of 
RPTs 
% of 
the 
Sample
Market-bas
ed2
444 
73.75 
1,186 80.85 1,911 78.13 3,541 78.43 
Cost-based
3
158 
27.25 
281 19.15  535 21.87  974 21.57 
Total 
number of 
RPTs 
602 1,467 2,446 4,515 
 
 
Sample size: 4,515 
 
 
1. Pricing methods are the transfer pricing methods used in related party transactions. 
According to previous study (Chan and Lo, 2004), I classify these methods into to groups: 
cost-based and market-based pricing methods, which are commonly recognized in research. 
 
2. Market-based methods include uncontrolled price method and national regulated price 
method.  
 
3. Cost-based methods include cost plus method and profit split method. 
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TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics on Variables (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Corporate Characteristics of Sample Firms 
 
 
  2003 2004 2005 Total 
Types of 
firms1
No. of 
RPTs 
% of 
the 
Sample 
No. of 
RPTs 
% of 
the 
Sample
No. of 
RPTs 
% of 
the 
Sample
No. of 
RPTs 
% of 
the 
Sample
Government- 
controlled3
486 80.73  1,173 79.96  1,991 81.40  3,650 80.84 
Others4 116 19.27  294 20.04 455 18.60 865 19.16 
Total number 
of RPTs  602 1,467 2,446 4,515 
         
         
  2003 2004 2005 Total 
Duality 
No. of 
RPTs 
% of 
the 
Sample 
No. of 
RPTs 
% of 
the 
Sample
No. of 
RPTs 
% of 
the 
Sample
No. of 
RPTs 
% of 
the 
Sample
Non-dual5
1,353 92.23  1,353
  
92.23 2,290 93.62  4,193 92.87 
Dual6 52 8.64 114 7.77 156 6.38 322 7.13 
Total number 
of RPTs 602 1,467 2,446 4,515 
 
 
  2003 2004 2005 Total 
  
No. 
of 
RPTs Mean 
Std. 
Devia
tion 
No. 
of 
RPTs Mean
Std. 
Devia
tion 
No. 
of 
RPTs Mean
Std. 
Devia
tion 
No. 
of 
RPTs Mean
Std. 
Devia
tion 
#BOD7
602 10.07 2.267 1467 9.70 1.97 2446 9.75 2.03 4515 9.77 2.05 
%ID8 602 0.331 0.056 1467 0.35 0.04 2446 0.35 0.05 4515 0.34 0.05 
 
Sample size: 4,515 
 
1. The classification is based on the ultimate shareholder type from 2003 to 2005. 
2. Government-controlled firms are those whose ultimate shareholders are state-owned assets 
management bureaus, state-owned assets management companies or local government 
agencies. 
3. Others are the remaining firms in the sample, controlled by non-group and 
non-government entities, for example, universities, joint ventures and individual owners. 
4. Non-dual firms are those whose chairman and an executive of the company is not the same 
person. 
5. Dual firms are those whose chairman and an executive of the company is the same person. 
6. #BOD is the number of boarder members. 
7. %ID is the percentage of independent directors on the board. 
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TABLE 4 
 
Panel A: Univariate Test of Effects of Ownership on Pricing Methods 
 
Sample size: 4,515 
 
  
Government 
-controlled Other Total  
 
NO. of 
RPTs 
% of the 
sample 
NO. of 
RPTs 
% of the 
sample 
NO. of 
RPTs 
% of the 
sample 
Market-based 2459 80.28 1082 74.52 3541 78.42 
Cost-based 604 19.72 370 25.48 974 21.57 
Total  3063 100 1452 100 4515 100 
Chi-Square  19.336*** 
*** Indicates significance at 1 percent level. 
 
 
 
Panel B: Univariate Test of Effects of CEO/Chairman Duality on Pricing 
Methods  
 
DUAL NON-DUAL Total  
  
NO. of 
RPTs 
% of the 
sample 
NO. of 
RPTs 
% of the 
sample 
NO. of 
RPTs 
% of the 
sample 
Market-based 226 68.07 3315 79.06 3541 79.43 
Cost-based 96 31.93 878 20.94 974 21.57 
Total  332 100 4193 100 4515 100 
Chi-Square  13.919***      
*** Indicates significance at 1 percent level. 
 
 
Panel C: Univariate Test of Effects of Board Size on Pricing Methods 
 
  No. of RPTs Mean Board Size? Std. Deviation 
Market-based 3541 9.853149 2.124357 
Cost-based 974 9.485626 1.710646 
T-test of the difference in means : t-statistic =4.9738*** 
 
 
Panel D: Univariate Test of Effects of Percentage of Independent 
Directors on Pricing Methods 
 
 No. of RPTs Mean %ID? Std. Deviation 
Market-based 3541 .3441758 .0460001 
Cost-based 974 .3444565 .0493687 
T-test of the difference in means : t-statistic =0.1660 ( p-value= 0.5659) 
 
 
 
TABLE 5. Correlations among Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
  
  PM GOV #BOD %ID DUAL HIGH_TECH RPT/SALES Ln_ASSET YEAR1 YEAR2 MARKET 
PM 1.000    
GOV -.081** 1.000   
#BOD -.074** .127** 1.000   
%ID .002 -.086** -.129** 1.000   
DUAL .056** .012 -.030* -.037* 1.000   
HIGH_TEC
H .082** .017 .021 .064** .099** 1.000  
RPT/SALES .027 .026 -.001 -.010 .012 .011 1.000  
LN_ASSET -.058** .184** .112** .153** -.047** -.028 -.040** 1.000  
YEAR1 .045** -.001 .056** -.112** .023 -.014 .002 -.023 1.000  
YEAR2 -.041** -.016 -.026 .020 .017 .023 .004 -.059** -.272** 1.000  
MARKET -.039** .106** .020 .024 -.032* .120** -.040** .125** -.192** .145** 1.000 
 
_________________________________________ 
Sample size: 4,515 
*,**,*** Correlation is significant at the 10%，5%，1% level, respectively, using Spearman’s correlation test. 
 
Definitions of variables: 
PM = 1 if cost-based methods are used, 0 otherwise; 
GOV = 1 if the company is government-controlled, 0 otherwise; 
#BOD = number of board members; 
%ID = percentage of independent directors on the board; 
DUAL = 1 if the chairman and an executive of the company is the same person, 0 otherwise; 
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Control Variable: 
HIGH_TECH = 1 if the company is in a high-tech industry, 0 otherwise; 
RPT/SALES = the amount of related party transaction divided by sales; 
LN_ASSET = natural logarithm of total asset. 
YEAR1 = 1 if the year is 2003, 0 otherwise; 
YEAR2 = 1 if the year is 2004, 0 otherwise; 
MAEKET =1 if the firm is listed on Shanghai Stock Market; 0 otherwise 
 
TABLE 6. Regression Results for the Impact of Corporate Governance on 
the Choice of Transfer Pricing Methods 
 
Logistic Regression equation: 
PM = α0 + α1GOV+ α2#BOD + α3%ID +α4DUAL + α5HIGH_TECH +  
   α6RPT/SALES + α7LN_ASSET +α8YEAR1 + α9YEAR2 + 
α10MARKET + ε 
 
 
Independent  
Variable 
 
 
Predicted 
Sign 
Regression 
Coefficient 
 
 Sig. 
CONSTANT   1.709  0.053* 
GOV  - -0.396  0.000*** 
#BOD  ? -0.084  0.000*** 
%ID  - -0.413  0.605 
DUAL  + 0.388  0.003*** 
HIGH_TECH  + 0.593  0.000*** 
RPT/SALES  ? 0.774  0.127 
LN_ASSET  ? -0.081  0.049** 
YEAR1  ? 0.212  0.051* 
YEAR2  ? -0.198  0.018** 
MARKET  ? -0.132  0.108 
      
Chi-square     116.631 
Percentage correct     78.3% 
Sig.     0.000*** 
________________________ 
Sample size: 4,515 
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
Definitions of variables: 
PM = 1 if cost-based methods are used, 0 otherwise; 
GOV = 1 if the company is government-controlled, 0 otherwise; 
#BOD = number of board members; 
%ID = percentage of independent directors on the board; 
DUAL = 1 if the chairman and an executive of the company is the same person, 0 otherwise; 
Control Variable: 
HIGH_TECH = 1 if the company is in a high-tech industry, 0 otherwise; 
RPT/SALES = the amount of related party transaction divided by sales; 
LN_ASSET = natural logarithm of total asset. 
YEAR1 = 1 if the year is 2003, 0 otherwise; 
YEAR2 = 1 if the year is 2004, 0 otherwise; 
MARKET =1 if the firm is listed on Shanghai Stock Market; 0 otherwise 
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TABLE 7. Summary of Sensitivity Test Results (Test #1 and #2) 
 
    (a)1  (b)2
Independent  
Variable 
 
 
Predicted 
Sign 
 Regression
Coefficient
 
 P-value 
 Regression 
Coefficient 
 P-value 
CONSTANT    1.845  0.036  1.994  0.007 
GOV  -  -.385  0.000***  -0.350  0.000***
#BOD  ?  -0.079  0.000***  -0.079  0.000***
%ID  -  -0.054  0.946  -0.340  0.667 
DUAL  +  0.465  0.000***  0.495  0.000***
HIGH_TECHa  +  0.224  0.017**  -  - 
HIGH_TECHb  +  -  -  0.531  0.000***
RPT/SALES  ?  0.813  0.109  0.849  0.095* 
LN_ASSET  ?  -0.096  0.019**  -0.099  0.015** 
YEAR1  ?  0.230  0.034**  0.233  0.033** 
YEAR2  ?  -0.201  0.016**  -0.208  0.013** 
MAREKT  ?  0.067  0.412  -0.072  0.377 
           
Chi-square      90.900    114.597 
Sig.      0.000***    0.000***
_____________________________ 
Sample size: 4,515 
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
1. Column (a) presents the results from estimating the model with alternative proxy for 
HIGH_TAXa. 
2. Column (a) presents the results from estimating the model with alternative proxy for 
HIGH_TAXb. 
Definitions of variables: 
PM = 1 if cost-based methods are used, 0 otherwise; 
GOV = 1 if the company is government-controlled, 0 otherwise; 
#BOD = number of board members; 
%ID = percentage of independent directors on the board; 
DUAL = 1 if the chairman and an executive of the company is the same person, 0 otherwise; 
HIGH_TECHa = 1 if the company enjoys the high-tech preferential tax rate, 0 otherwise; 
HIGH_TECHb = 1 if the subsidiaries of the company enjoys the high-tech preferential tax 
rate, 0 otherwise; RPT/SALES = the amount of related party transaction divided by sales; 
LN_ASSET = natural logarithm of total asset. 
YEAR1 = 1 if the year is 2003, 0 otherwise; 
YEAR2 = 1 if the year is 2004, 0 otherwise; 
MARKET =1 if the firm is listed on Shanghai Stock Market; 0 otherwise 
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TABLE 8. Summary of Sensitivity Test Results (Test #3) 
 
 
Independent  
Variable 
 
 
Predicted 
Sign 
Regression 
Coefficient 
 
 Sig. 
CONSTANT   1.861  0.292 
GOV  - -0.407  0.000*** 
#BOD  + -0.060   0.001*** 
%ID  - -0.556   0.498 
DUAL  + -0.330   0.015** 
AUDIT  - -0.147  0.370 
HIGH_TECH  + 0.641  0.000*** 
RPT/SALES  ? 1.170  0.035** 
LN_ASSET  ? -0.640  0.126 
YEAR1  ? 0.105  0.358 
YEAR2  ? -0.194  0.023** 
MARKET  ? -0.138  0.097* 
Chi-square     101.90 
Sig.     0.000*** 
 
                     
Sample size: 4,515 
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
Definitions of variables: 
PM = 1 if cost-based methods are used, 0 otherwise; 
GOV = 1 if the company is government-controlled, 0 otherwise; 
#BOD = number of board members; 
%ID = percentage of independent directors on the board; 
DUAL = 1 if the chairman and an executive of the company is the same person, 0 otherwise; 
AUDIT= 1 if the company has established an audit committee, 0 otherwise 
HIGH_TECH = 1 if the company is in a high-tech industry, 0 otherwise; 
RPT/SALES = the amount of related party transaction divided by sales; 
LN_ASSET = natural logarithm of total asset. 
YEAR1 = 1 if the year is 2003, 0 otherwise; 
YEAR2 = 1 if the year is 2004, 0 otherwise; 
MAEKET =1 if the firm is listed on Shanghai Stock Market; 0 otherwise 
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TABLE 9. Summary of Sensitivity Test Results (Test #4) 
 
Independent  
Variable 
 
 
Predicted 
Sign 
 Regression 
Coefficient 
 
 P-value 
CONSTANT    1.802  0.058* 
GOV  -  -0.327  0.000*** 
#BOD  ?  -0.078  0.000*** 
%ID  -  -0.101  0.904 
DUAL  +  -0.356  0.008*** 
HIGH_TECH  +  0.535  0.000*** 
RPT/SALES  ?  1.063  0.118 
LN_ASSET  ?  -0.056  0.192 
YEAR1  ?  0.140  0.197 
YEAR2  ?  -0.275  0.001*** 
MAREKT  ?  -0.180  0.030*** 
       
Chi-square      100.85 
Sig.      0.000*** 
 
                     
Sample size: 4,279 
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
We exclude all the transactions whose subject matters are mandatorily priced by government.  
Definitions of variables: 
PM = 1 if cost-based methods are used, 0 otherwise; 
GOV = 1 if the company is government-controlled, 0 otherwise; 
#BOD = number of board members; 
%ID = percentage of independent directors on the board; 
DUAL = 1 if the chairman and an executive of the company is the same person, 0 otherwise; 
AUDIT= 1 if the company has established an audit committee, 0 otherwise 
HIGH_TECH = 1 if the company is in a high-tech industry, 0 otherwise; 
RPT/SALES = the amount of related party transaction divided by sales; 
LN_ASSET = natural logarithm of total asset. 
YEAR1 = 1 if the year is 2003, 0 otherwise; 
YEAR2 = 1 if the year is 2004, 0 otherwise; 
MAEKET =1 if the firm is listed on Shanghai Stock Market; 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56
APPENDIX I 
 
Guideline on the Management of Listed Companies 
 
Chapter 1 Section 3 
 
Article 12. Written agreements shall be entered into for related party 
transactions among a listed company and its connected parties. Such agreements 
shall observe principles of equality, voluntarity, and making compensation for 
equal value. The contents of such agreements shall be specific and concrete. 
Matters such as the signing, amendment, termination and execution of such 
agreements shall be disclosed by the listed company in accordance with relevant 
regulations. 
 
Article 13. Efficient measures shall be adopted by a listed company to 
prevent its connected parties from interfering with the operation of the company 
and damaging the company’s interests by monopolizing purchase or sales 
channels. Related party transactions shall observe commercial principles. In 
principle, the prices for related party transactions shall not deviate from an 
independent third party’s market price or charging standard. The company shall 
fully disclose the basis for pricing for related party transactions. 
 
Article 14. The assets of a listed company belong to the company. The 
company shall adopt efficient measures to prevent its shareholders and their 
affiliates from misappropriating or transferring the capital, assets or other 
resources of the company through various means. A listed company shall not 
provide financial guarantees for its shareholders or their affiliates. 
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